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A New Model of Big Power Relations?
China–US strategic rivalry and balance
of power in the Asia–Pacific
SUISHENG ZHAO*
Exploring the causes of the China–US strategic rivalry and its possible mitigation, this
article argues that President Xi’s new model of big power relations represents a challenge to
the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China’s rising power and deeply rooted
suspicion of the US containment. But neither the US nor China can be the single dominant
power in the region. The new model can be built only if China and the US demonstrate a
strategic restraint and maintain a delicate balance of power to prevent their rivalry from
boiling over into a new Cold War.
Although Presidents Xi Jinping and Obama have agreed on the concept of a new
model of big power relations (新型大国关系) to free China and the US from the so-
called ‘Thucydides trap’ with the established power and the emerging power
colliding inexorably, their strategic mistrust continues to worsen and the rivalry has
intensified in the Asia–Pacific. The US and China have both failed to elaborate on an
array of implicit and explicit norms and rules of the potential geopolitical
engagement that would lead to mutual restraint and help moderate their competition.
The new model promotes that China’s rise would not be accompanied by the conflict
and war that marred many other moments in history when rising powers rubbed up
against the incumbent power. But China has increasingly behaved as a typical
muscle-flexing rising power looking to challenge the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific
and seek expanded interests by advancing its territorial claims in the East and South
China Seas. Criticizing China’s ‘unilateral’, ‘provocative’, ‘coercive’ and
‘escalatory’ behavior as an attempt to change the regional status quo, the US has
taken measured counter-actions to check China’s territorial advances, including
sending a pair of American B52 bombers flying across China’s newly declared Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. Amid rising tension
between China and its neighbors, President Obama signed a ten-year defense
agreement with the Philippines and became the first sitting US president to state that
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the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are subject to Article 5 of the Japan–US
Security Treaty. Hedge and even containment have gained momentum among
a growing number of American strategists. These developments have raised the
question: how, if at all, can China and the US build a new model of big power
relations? Exploring the causes of the China–US strategic rivalry and its possible
mitigation, this article argues that President Xi’s new model of big power relations
presented a challenge to the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China’s rising
capacities and deeply rooted suspicion of the US containment. Just as containment is
not a viable option for the US, regional dominance cannot be a viable objective for
China. Neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power in the region.
The new model can be built only if China and the US can work together and maintain
a delicate balance of power to prevent their rivalry from boiling over into a new
Cold War.
A realist reading of the new model of big power relations
In realist literature international politics is a struggle for power and rising powers
seek to maximize their security by expanding their influence and control over their
immediate neighborhoods, and in many cases, far beyond. Realism defines power as
the general capacity of a state to influence the behavior of others or the ability to get
others to do what they otherwise would not do. It seems to prove the realist logic that
a rising China has moved from a passive to a proactive foreign policy to seek
dominance in the Asia–Pacific. Making foreign policy decisions in a hierarchical
world of power structure that is constantly in flux because of variations in relative
powers, Chinese leaders have been under pressure to maintain or challenge the status
quo, depending on whether they view the trend in the international balance of power
or their own strength vis-a`-vis their adversaries as favorable or unfavorable. Beijing
has avoided unnecessary provocation from an unfavorable position but strived to
maximize power and seek dominance from a favorable position by denying regional
hegemony of other powers.
Conditioned by China’s circumscribed capabilities and geostrategic isolation
immediately after the end of the Cold War, Beijing followed taoguangyanghui (韬光
养晦) policy set by Deng Xiaoping to keep a low profile and concentrate on building
up its national strength. Seeking peaceful coexistence with the US, the unwieldy
superpower holding the key to China’s economic modernization, President Jiang
Zemin proposed a 16 characters formula in 1993: increase trust, reduce problems,
strengthen cooperation and avoid confrontation (增加信任,减小麻烦,加强合作,不
搞对抗). Promoting a multipolar world, China tried ‘learning to live with the
hegemon’ and made adaptation and policy adjustments to the reality of the US
dominance in the international system.1 China, as one of the weaker poles in the
multipolar world, did not want to become the second ‘Mr No’ and repeat the failure of
the Soviet Union in a competition for hegemony that exhausted its economic and
military capacity. Defending its national interest by conducting shrewd diplomacy,
1. Jia Qingguo, ‘Learning to live with the hegemon: evolution of China’s policy toward the US since the end of
the Cold War’, Journal of Contemporary China 14(44), (2005), p. 395.
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which ‘requires rationality and calmness’,2 President Jiang avoided taking
confrontational postures in responses to US sanctions after Tiananmen in 1989, the
US inadvertent bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999, and the mid-air collision
between a Chinese jet fighter and US EP-3 surveillance plane in 2001.
President Hu Jintao continued to focus on building China’s comprehensive
national strength. Focusing on domestic stability (内政主导), Hu’s foreign policy
emphasized the principles of maintaining the status quo (维护现状) and averting
crisis (危机规避) in order to extend a period of strategic opportunity (战略机遇期) in
which a benign external environment would allow China to pursue its modernization
programs.3 Cherishing China’s rising power status, Chinese leaders were very
cautious to hide their big power aspirations. President Hu endorsed the concept of
China’s ‘peaceful rise’ originally put forward by his aid, Zheng Bijian, but quickly
changed this to ‘peaceful development’ because some Chinese scholars and officials
expressed concerns about whether using the word ‘rise’ could intimidate some of
China’s Asian neighbors as the word ‘rise’ might imply attaining superpower status.
During a visit to Europe in early 2009, some sensitive Western reporters pricked up
their ears at Premier Wen’s statement that China would be a peaceful and cooperative
big power. When asked for clarification of the phrase ‘big power’, the government
news agency, Xinhua, released an English text that translated the word as ‘country’
instead. While many Chinese were initially flattered by the G-2 idea amounting to a
Sino–US cooperative, Premier Wen rejected the idea as ‘not appropriate’ and
reiterated that ‘China remains a developing country despite remarkable achievements
and its modernization will take a long time and the efforts of several generations’.4
Narrowing the power gap with the US and weathering the 2009 global financial
crisis better than many Western countries, Chinese began to see a shift in the world
balance of power in China’s favor. Anticipating a rapid US decline, China’s foreign
policy behavior took a notable turn in the wake of the global slowdown. For many
years, Chinese foreign policy was designed to serve domestic economic
modernization (外交服务于国内经济建设) by creating and maintaining a peaceful
international environment. Fused with growing nationalism and wealth, China began
to reverse the order and use its rising economic and military power to serve its
expanded foreign policy objectives. With the US in financial turmoil and seemingly
desperate for cash-rich China to come to its aid, the perception of a troubled US still
attempting to keep China down makes Chinese leaders less willing to make
adaptations. Although far from a full reversal of what had long been a mixed practice,
the center of gravity shifted toward less accommodation. Facing rumblings of
discontent from the popular nationalists who saw the global downturn as a chance for
China to reclaim its great power status, the Hu leadership began to take an unusually
hawkish position to confront the Obama administration in its own neighborhood.
2. 沈骥如 [Shen Jiru], 中国不当不先生 [China Does Not Want to Be Mr. No ] (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo
Chubanshe, 1998), p. 62.
3. You Ji, ‘The PLA and diplomacy: unraveling myths about the military role in foreign policy-making’, Journal
of Contemporary China 23(86), (2014), p. 240.
4. ‘Chinese Premier rejects allegation of China, US monopolizing world affairs in future’, Xinhua, (21 May
2009), available at: http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6662376.html.
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In March 2009, just one month after President Obama took office, the Chinese
media provided intensive coverage of the interception of an American surveillance
ship, the USSN Impeccable, in the South China Sea where the American navy had
frequently deployed to monitor China’s military activities. While Chinese always
viewed the US surveillance operation close to its national borders as a challenge to its
national security and territorial integrity, China had never taken such high profile
actions to stop US ships in its EEZ. Following this incident, Beijing took an unusually
assertive position against the joint US–South Korean military exercise in 2010.
Beijing specifically objected to the USS George Washington aircraft carrier being
deployed in the Yellow Sea. Although the US navy had long conducted exercises
there, Chinese experts now warned that deployment in the area would place the
Chinese capital within the carrier’s striking distance. Between early June when
the news was revealed and early July when Washington confirmed the exercises, the
spokesman at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued six official protests with a
successively tougher tone, beginning by calling on involved parties to ‘maintain calm
and constraint’, followed by expressing ‘concern’ and ‘serious concern’, then
morphing into words such as ‘oppose’ and ‘strongly oppose’.5
President Hu’s forceful and strident stands have been reinforced since President Xi
Jinping assumed power. Believing China has never been so close to regaining the
glorious position it enjoyed about two centuries ago, President Xi set to achieve a
‘China dream’ of great national revitalization. Calling for a new model of big power
relations, Chinese leaders for the first time openly acknowledged China as a ‘big
power’ and one of equals with the US. Although the traditional realist definition of a
big power includes only economic and military capacities, Chinese leaders talk about
the new model of big power relations to include its ties with traditional and emerging
powers,6 yet none of these relations rises to the level of the Sino–US
relationship. Only the US and China, as the two largest economies in the world,
qualify as big powers that must work together to build the new model.
Chinese leaders have included three essential features in describing the newmodel:
no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect, and win–win cooperation (不冲突不对
抗,相互尊重,合作共赢). But Beijing has made it clear that ‘mutual respect’ of each
other’s ‘core national interests’ is the bottom line. The new model, therefore, is not
just another facade on the old rhetoric of peaceful coexistence. Now China and the
US can coexist peacefully only if they respect each other’s core interests and make
their strategic aspirations compatible. As executive vice president of China’s Central
Party School stated, for China and the US to build the new model, these two countries
‘need to understand and respect each other’s bottom line and not challenge or break
through the bottom line of the other side’.7
5. Cary Huang, ‘PLA ramped up China’s stand on US–Korea drill: Beijing rhetoric evolves from neutral to shrill
saber-rattling’, South China Morning Post, (6 August 2010), available at: http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/
menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?
vgnextoid¼8018423df234a210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss ¼ China&s ¼ News.
6. 中国社会科学院中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心 [The Center for the Study of Socialist Theory with
Chinese Characteristics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ‘构建新型大国关系’ [‘Construction of a new
model of major country relations’],人民日报 [People’s Daily ], (4 June 2013), p. 7.
7. Li Jingtian, ‘Building on the bottom line’, People’s Daily, (1 July 2013), available at: http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/cndy/2013-07/01/content_16694116.htm.
SUISHENG ZHAO
380
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [A
lm
a M
ate
r S
tud
ior
um
 - 
Un
ive
rsi
tà 
di 
Bo
log
na
] a
t 0
6:5
3 1
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
Core interest (核心利益), a new term in China’s foreign policy vocabulary, has
suddenly become fashionable and appears frequently in Chinese statements.
Obviously chosen with intent to signal the resolve in China’s sovereignty and
territorial claims that it deems important enough to go to war over, core interest is
defined as ‘the bottom-line of national survival’ and ‘essentially nonnegotiable’.8
While China’s official statements on the sovereignty and territorial integrity used to
refer almost exclusively to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang issues,9 Chinese leaders have
expanded the core interest issues to include territorial claims in the South and East
China Seas. Taking an unusually strong position to assert its sovereignty in these
disputed waters, Beijing repeatedly attempted to prevent Vietnamese vessels from
exploring oil and gas while it sent Chinese oil rigs to disputed waters with Vietnam,
deployed ships to blockade the Philippines garrison on a contested shoal and rejected
Manila’s bid for international court of justice arbitration, and scaled up land
reclamation of ‘island-building’ on the disputed reefs in the South China Sea. It also
sent law enforcement ships and fighter jets to challenge the status quo of the Japanese
administration of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands following the Japanese
government’s decision to nationalize some of them, and declared an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) covering the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as well as the
greater part of the East China Sea, including the Socotra Rock (also known as Ieodo
or Parangdo), which has been effectively controlled by South Korea but claimed by
China as the Suyan Rock.10
Translating its wealth into a stronger military and more assertive regional posture,
China’s coercive action to exert its claims over disputed territories is widely seen as a
litmus test of China’s broader strategic intentions. This is because Beijing has
targeted not only its neighbors in the East and South China Seas but also, and perhaps
more importantly, the US in the region. China’s stepped-up claims over the disputed
territories are a central part of the growing contest for influence with the US in the
region. Hugh White offers simple logic to describe the situation. America’s position
in Asia is built on its network of alliances and partnerships with many of China’s
neighbors, and the bedrock of these alliances and partnerships is the confidence
America’s Asian friends have that America is able and willing to protect them.
Weakening these relationships is the easiest way to reduce US regional power and
enhance China’s power.11 This is a strategy known in China as ‘cutting skirt edges
little by little’ (剪裙边), meaning that cutting off the left and right arms and legs one
by one of the US would eventually isolate and defeat the superpower. China is,
8. 陈岳 [Chen Yue], ‘中国当前外交环境及应对’ [‘The current international environment and the responses’],
现代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations ], (November 2011), p. 4.
9. Wu Xinbo, ‘Forging Sino–US partnership in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges’, Journal of
Contemporary China 21(75), (2012), p. 393.
10. An ADIZ is not a claim of sovereignty but to serve essentially as a national defense boundary within which
unidentified aircraft can be intercepted and prevented from illegally proceeding to enter national airspace. Over 20
nations have an ADIZ, including the United States and Japan. China’s ADIZ, however, has different rules from the
others. While the others require airplanes that plan to fly over and perhaps land to register, China demands the planes
of the other countries flying through but not going toward landing identify themselves or risk China’s ‘defensive
emergency measures’.
11. Hugh White, ‘Explaining China’s behavior in the East and South China Seas’, Lowey Interpreter, (22 May
2014), available at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post.aspx?COLLCC¼3598638751&COLLCC ¼ 3551546041&
id ¼ 9b323026-c52c-4c27-90d7-885758f64c92.
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therefore, keen to do anything it can to weaken the US alliance structure in Asia,
which it views as a central tenet of the US encirclement strategy.
As a matter of fact, Chinese scholars have debated if China should adopt its own
‘Monroe Doctrine’ to ‘kick America out’ of Asia. De-Americanization (去美国化)
has become a popular term in China and has begun impacting on China’s foreign
policy. Taking advantage of the so-called ‘Host Diplomacy’ (主场外交) to engage
national leaders of Asian countries in summits hosted by China, President Xi has
demonstrated clear intentions to drive the US out of the region. At the 2014 Shanghai
summit of the Conference of Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA), he
announced a new Asian security concept in which China is located at the heart of a
new Asian diplomatic architecture that offers Asian management of Asian security
problems without the US presence. This little-known regional summit had languished
for years, but President Xi suddenly invigorated the CICA because its membership
includes Russia, Iran and Egypt, but does not include the US and most American
Asia–Pacific allies and partners, such as Japan, the Philippines and Singapore.
As one observer suggested, ‘part of the real reason for China’s new emphasis on the
CICA and its arbitrarily landlocked map of Asia is that, in this post-charm offensive
phase, Chinese diplomacy seems comfortable only on a stage it manages’.12
The deep-rooted Chinese suspicion of the US containment
With enhanced capacities resulting from decades of rapid economic growth and
military modernization, China has strived to obtain regional dominance in the Asia–
Pacific. Its primary impediment in this endeavor is theUS, an offshore power dominant
in its own home region. Viewing the US as a significant threat to China’s aims and
recalling the traumas of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and other communist
regimes after the end of the Cold War, Chinese leaders have not only become
suspicious of US intentions to prevent China from rising to its rightful place, but have
also been convinced that theUS and the otherWestern countries have come together to
encircle China and undermine the Chinese regime. They have interpreted key
international events such as the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the US military
presence in the region, particularly its security allianceswith Japan and thePhilippines,
from this understanding, in a mirror-reflection of its own realist perspective.
One survey of more than 4,000 articles published in two mainstream Chinese
scholarly journals and one popular magazine of international affairs during
2001–2004 found that Chinese interpretations of the US strategic intent behind the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars and prediction of the occupation’s strategic ramifications,
all adopted realist theories in sync with alternation of offensive and defensive realism
(清一色的现实主义理论，进攻性现实主义与防御性现实主义交替出现). After
the wars started, there was almost no Chinese scholar who predicted that the US
would eventually withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan because, from an offensive
realist perspective, they believed that the US would stay and establish pro-American
governments to consolidate its position in Eurasia in an attempt to maintain American
12. Rory Medcalf, ‘China’s premature power play goes very wrong’, National Interest, (3 June 2014), available
at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-premature-power-play-goes-very-wrong-10587.
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global hegemony and complete the encirclement of China from China’s Western
fronts.13 A conspiracy-minded 100-minute film produced by the PLA National
Defense University that was circulating widely on the Internet in late 2013 accused
the United States of actively working to sabotage the Chinese government and to
impose American values on China in an attempt to contain China’s rise.14 Seeing an
inevitable structural conflict between China as a rising power and the US as the sole
superpower, many Chinese have seen containment as not just one of many arguments
in the US China policy debate, but the real US policy.
President Obama’s strategic rebalance strategy toward the Asia–Pacific is thus
easily interpreted as US determination to curtail China’s influence in the region. This
includes the use of all the elements of its power, particularly military force, to
perpetuate a future for the region framed by American values and interests.
In Beijing’s view, deeply embedded in the rebalance is Washington’s profound
concern about China’s rise. Under this overarching theme, Beijing sees a
comprehensive policy by Washington to block China’s rise through strengthened
military alliances with Japan and other allies and partners, ‘sabotaging’ China’s ties
with ASEAN, and undercutting China’s effort to lead the regional economic
integration by pushing for a US-centered and China-free Trans-Pacific
Partnership. Although President Obama has repeatedly assured Beijing that ‘we
welcome China’s peaceful rise and a strong and prosperous China is one that can
help bring stability and prosperity to the region and the world’,15 many Chinese have
remained skeptical about the US rationale behind the strategic rebalance.
Although China is a major component, the strategic rebalance is not all about
China. The US has been a Pacific power with significant economic, political and
security interests in the Asia–Pacific since the nineteenth century. Yet the US
involvement in the region has not been consistent and has included frequent shifts in
focus and fickle commitments, depending on its ability and will to set policy priorities
and define US interests. The US has regularly rebalanced and adjusted its
involvement in the region. At least three rebalances can be identified since the end of
the Cold War. Investing heavily in regional security to contain the Soviet expansion
during the Cold War, the US was compelled to rebalance its policy priorities at the
end of the Cold War by downplaying military commitments, pursuing economic
interests and promoting democratic transition in the region. The first rebalance led the
US to pursue multiple, often contradictory, policy objectives, resulting in public
disputes with many countries in the region. This included disputes with China over
most-favored-nation trade status, human rights, weapons proliferation and the
Taiwan issue; with Japan over trade; and with Myanmar over political legitimacy.
When President George W. Bush came to office in 2000, he promised a reinvigorated
engagement with Asian allies. The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, however,
13. 牛新春 [Nu Xinchun], ‘集体性失明：反思中国学界对伊战 、阿战的预测’ [‘Collective blindness:
reflecting on predictions from Chinese scholars concerning the Iraq and Afghan wars’], 现代国际关系
[Contemporary International Relations ] no. 4, (2014), pp. 1–9.
14. The film is available on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼XhHvhm3Ey_0.
15. ‘Remarks by President Obama and Vice President Xi of the People’s Republic of China before bilateral
meeting, February 2012’, available at: http://www.cfr.org/china/remarks-president-obama-vice-president-xi-peoples-
republic-china-before-bilateral-meeting-february-2012/p27391.
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forced the US to rebalance its priorities and turn its attention almost exclusively
toward the Middle East. As a result, the Asia–Pacific never found its place on the
Bush agenda and Washington’s influence in the Asia–Pacific waned because of the
divergences of interests between the US and its various allies. The start of the Obama
administration began the third rebalance. Winding down the wars in the Middle East,
the Obama administration decided to ‘pivot’ toward the Asia–Pacific, an emerging
economic hub and a geostrategic center critical to US national security and the health
of the US economy. In this case, ‘This reshuffling of priorities represents an
acknowledgment of the changing geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century—
not simply a response to China’.16
China, however, still holds a central place in the rebalance because the US has to
respond to the call by many Asian Pacific countries to provide a constructive
counterweight to China’s rising influence that has altered the power balance in the
region. In the late 1980s, China designed a 睦邻政策 (good neighboring policy) to
emphasize shared economic and security interests and improved relations with many
periphery countries. The success of China’s good neighboring policy coincided with
the era of American relative inattention to the region during the George W. Bush
administration. In a 2005 article, Elizabeth Economy predicted three possible
scenarios for the US in the region. The best scenario was that China would share
leadership with the US, helping to forge consensus within the region to address its
political, security and economic challenges. The less attractive scenario suggested a
traditional balancing act, in which Asian nations use China to ignore the US on
selective issues, developing alternative approaches to security, political and
economic affairs. The worst case scenario was that China would assume a dominant
role in the region and Asian nations would become less likely to respond favorably to
US security initiatives and less dependent on US economic leadership.17 None of the
three scenarios, however, came true because China embarked on a new pattern of
asserting its sovereignty claims in the territorial disputes with its neighbors in the
wake of the global financial crisis. Confronting a changing geopolitical environment,
the US strategic rebalance was thus welcomed by and came at the invitation of many
countries that were either worried about China’s muscle flexing or that tried to
exacerbate regional tensions in order to stoke fears of a rising China.
Believing that America’s military and diplomatic efforts in the region are aimed at
limiting China’s ability to pursue its expanded interests, Beijing is particularly
suspicious of the highly visible US military force redeployment to the region.
President Obama’s announcement in November 2011 of the deployment of 2,500 US
marines and aircraft on a rotational base to Darwin, Australia garnered a lot of
attention because the deployment could help the US military, traditionally
concentrated in Northeast Asia, to increase its influence west and south to contribute
to the security of sea lines in the South China Sea. Following the announcement, US
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta stated in June 2012 that the US navy would
16. Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, ‘Smart shift: a response to “The problem with the pivot”’, Foreign Affairs 92
(1), (2013), available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138720/shawn-brimley-and-ely-ratner/smart-shift.
17. Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s rise in Southeast Asia: implications for the United States’, Journal of
Contemporary China 14(44), (2005), p. 424.
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redeploy its forces from a roughly 50–50 split between the Atlantic and the Pacific to
about 60% of the navy’s assets assigned to the Pacific Ocean. In addition, the US
military developed a new military strategy, known as Air–Sea Battle (ASB), to
punch through the increasingly-formidable defenses of nations like China’s anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) capacities. Although the ASB concept did not
specifically target China, it predominantly focused on mitigating the strategic and
military effectiveness of the PLA’s asymmetric military capabilities.18
China’s suspicion also resulted from the US improving its relations with ASEAN
states in the face of shared concerns over China’s willingness to demonstrate its
enhanced military capabilities in the disputed waters. Beijing considered this to be
interferingwith a bilateral issuewith its SoutheastAsian claimant states. Beijing felt ‘the
US ambushed China in its backyard’ when Secretary of State Clinton declared in July
2010 that freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect
for international law in the South China Sea were in the US national interest and offered
to help foster multilateral negotiations as a US leading diplomatic priority. China was
particularly upset that the remarks were made in Vietnam, a country that has territorial
disputes with China, andwas seeking to exploit its turn as ASEAN chairman to keep the
South China Sea dispute on the boiler. Beijing became even more suspicious when the
US accepted an ASEAN invitation to participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS) and,
taking a result-oriented approach, set an ambitious goal for the EAS to develop into a
foundational security and political institution. Attending the EAS for the first time in
November 2011, President Obama brought up the contentious issues of the South China
Sea and North Korea. While most Asian countries aligned with Washington at the
summit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was grouchy and responded that ‘outside forces’
had noexcuse tomeddle in the complexmaritimedispute,whichwas a veiledwarning to
the United States to keep out of the sensitive issue at multilateral venues.19
China’s suspicions only increased as it witnessed the Obama administration’s
efforts to re-energize America’s bilateral ties with Japan. Beijing was very upset by
the US reconfirmation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands under the effective
administration of the Japanese government covered by Article 5 of the US–Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which authorizes the US to protect Japan
in the event of an armed attack. Beijing was further dismayed with the US support of
the Abe administration’s attempt to revise its interpretation of the Japanese
Constitution to exercise the ‘collective self-defense’ right, which would enable Japan
to support US military activities when it comes to Asian security. Regarding Japan as
a proxy for US power, Beijing is convinced that the United States would try to benefit
from territorial disputes in the East China Sea. China perceives that Japan’s
continuing impertinence to defy a rising China is because of its US alliance. China
also considers Philippine activities in the disputed waters, including the Scarborough
Shoal, to have been influenced by Washington. The US efforts to strengthen its
diplomatic and military relations with its allies in the region thus fueled China’s fears
18. US Department of Defense, ‘Joint operational access concept’, (17 January 2012), available at: http://www.
defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.
19. Christopher Freise, ‘By invitation, mostly: the international politics of the US security presence, China, and
the South China Sea’, RSIS Working Papers no. 247, (28 August 2012), available at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/
publications/workingpapers/wp247.pdf.
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about the US attempt to contain China’s rise. ‘Consequently, when China attempts to
gain control over disputed islands in the China seas, it does not only target at those
claimants, but also sends a signal of disapproval to the US.’20
Containment of China is not a viable policy option
China’s suspicion is not entirely groundless. Rising to great power status in a region
that is not only militarily dominated by the US, but is also replete with US allies and
strategic partners, China would have still exhibited considerable insecurity even in
the absence of the rebalance. The rebalance only compounds such anxieties because
it sends conflicting messages, reflecting ‘the strategic confusion that bedevils the US
approach to China and the region’.21 Indeed, there are some Americans who are
afraid of being pushed out of Asia and who have argued for containment of China’s
assertive behavior. They are willing to do whatever it takes to maintain US global as
well as regional primacy in spite of the fact that, as Mearsheimer argues, the result of
this great power rivalry is a tragedy.
Although China looms large over the new geopolitics of the region and there are
questions as to how China’s rise will eventually challenge US interests, the zero-sum
containment of China is not a viable option for the US. As the sole superpower after
the end of the Cold War, the US has to make a strategic response to the challenge of
China’s rise. Historically, incumbent powers have taken one of the following three
options. One is to ignore it as imperial China did in the nineteenth century.
The Chinese empire collapsed after it was defeated by Britain in the Opium War of
1840–1842 and by Japan in the Sino–Japanese war of 1894, and China experienced a
century of stagnation and humiliation after it refused to face the rise of these powers.
The second is to contain it as exemplified by eighteenth century imperial France’s
attempt to contain the emergence of rising power, England. It led not only to a long
series of battered and bloodied wars but also ended with Napoleon’s defeat by
Wellington at Waterloo. The third is to accept it as the British Empire did in the late
nineteenth century. Allowing a rising US to assume increasingly large
responsibilities for global governance, the UK not only avoided unnecessary
bloodshed but also maintained its institutional legacy in the post-British world.
The US is not willing to ignore China’s rise or simply cede the dominant position
to China. Containment is thus left as the only desirable option for many Americans.
But these Americans have to realize that any unilateral US attempts to contain China
are likely to be sporadic or self-defeating due to the following reasons. First, although
the US successfully carried out a containment strategy against the Soviet Union by
‘minimal social or economic interactions’ during the Cold War,22 the US–China
relationship is much more complicated. As Henry Kissinger indicates,
20. Zhongqi Pan, ‘Standing up to the challenge: China’s approach to its maritime disputes’, ISPI Analysis no. 184,
(June 2013), available at: http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/standing-challenge-chinas-approach-its-
maritime-disputes.
21. Amitai Etzioni, ‘Obama’s rebalancing: a fig leaf’, The Diplomat, (26 April 2014), available at: http://
thediplomat.com/2014/04/obamas-rebalancing-a-fig-leaf/.
22. Robert A. Manning, ‘US counterbalancing China, not containing’, East Asia Forum, (9 July 2013), available
at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/09/us-counterbalancing-china-not-containing/.
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The economy of the Soviet Union was weak (except for military production) and did not
affect the global economy. China, by contrast, is a dynamic factor in the world economy.
It is a principal trading partner of all its neighbors and most of the Western industrial
powers, including the United States. A prolonged confrontation between China and the
United States would alter the world economy with unsettling consequences for all.23
Indeed, as each other’s second-largest trading partners, their trade in goods in 2013
reached US$562.2 billion while the trade between the US and the former Soviet
Union was only about US$4 billion at its best. China holds more than US$1 trillion in
US treasury bonds. Chinese students are the largest international student source—
more than 200,000 students—in US universities and the Obama administration
launched a program of sending 100,000 American students to China. This is a very
different economic and security landscape than that confronted the architects of a
strategy to contain the Soviet Union. The current landscape will make it more
difficult, if not impossible, for the US to contain China.
Second, while none of China’s neighbors want to live under China’s shadow and
most regional powers have been publicly or privately pleased to see the stronger US
commitment to the Asia–Pacific region, very few of them can afford to antagonize a
rising China. They recognize that an escalation of the geopolitical rivalry between the
US and China could destroy the regional stability and prosperity. Their interests are
better protected by maintaining good relationships with both powers so that they can
continue to trade freely with China while benefiting from the US security umbrella.
For example, while most of the ASEAN states ‘have welcomed America as a hedge
against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly
dependent upon China and they don’t want to be a party to any potential conflict
between these two giants’.24 Even countries, such as the Philippines and Japan, that
believe it is in their best interests to make the US a rival to China, have tried to engage
China in their own ways. Taking a tough position in the territorial dispute with China,
Japanese PrimeMinister Shinzo Abe has repeatedly requested meetings with Chinese
President Xi to talk about their troubled relations in spite of China’s rejection.
Therefore, the US is not in a position to forge a strategic coalition in concert with
Asian countries to contain China.
Third, facing a world that is becoming increasingly diffused in power distribution,
American power ultimately depends on the health of its own domestic performances.
The US has yet to overcome the political gridlock that has prevented meaningful
governmental action and needs to get its fiscal house in order if it is to sustain its
Asian presence over the long run. The impact of sequestration in the summer of 2013,
which fell disproportionately on defense spending, already affected regional views of
American credibility. The budget battle that led to a government shutdown in
October 2013 and forced President Obama to cancel his Asia trip to attend the three
most important regional summits—the APEC Leaders Meeting, US–ASEAN and
23. Henry A. Kissinger, ‘The future of US–Chinese relations: conflict is a choice, not a necessity’, Foreign
Affairs 91(2), (2012), available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137245/henry-a-kissinger/the-future-of-us-
chinese-relations.
24. Michael Yahuda, ‘China’s new assertiveness in the South China Sea’, Journal of Contemporary China 22(81),
(2013), p. 446.
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East Asia Summit, and the US–ASEAN Summit—became an indication of the
United States’ incapability of sustaining high-level engagement in the region, further
diminishing US credibility. The no-show at the important summits because of
political paralysis at home not only highlighted the long-predicted limitations of
Washington’s rebalancing to East Asia, ‘it gives China, amid its insecurities about the
continuing American presence in China’s “backyard”, a golden, perhaps unwanted,
opportunity for further assertiveness in its region and in the world at large’.25
Fourth, the strategic rebalance is under-resourced on the military front. Having
fought two wars in the first decade of the twenty-first century that led to sharply
contracting defense budgets, the US is hardly prepared to step into another major
conflict in the Pacific. In spite of China’s concerns regarding American military
deployment, it is far from clear whether the Obama administration could afford its
forward deployment in the region for the long term to deliver on its promises.
Assessing the budgetary constraints, a Congressional Research Service report pointed
out that plans to restructure US military deployment in Asia and minimize cuts in the
navymay run up against more restrictive funding constrains than plans yet assumed.26
A January 2014USDefense News Leadership Poll found that 62% of respondents said
‘no’ when asked if the rebalance was affordable. Reflecting this concern, Katrina
McFarland, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, said that, due to cuts to the
defense budget, the Pentagon’s plans to pivot toAsia ‘can’t happen’.27 One observer in
Singapore, therefore, suggests that ‘Like it or not, America’s role in the Asia–Pacific
(not to mention globally) is in long-term relative decline’.28 As skepticism grows
toward the sustainability of the high-level military engagement widely held in the
region, it will only become more difficult for the US to carry out a strategy to contain
China.
Fifth, the US cannot afford to play a larger role in Asia and severely reduce the
resources necessary to maintain America’s global role. The Obama administration
has preferred to use the term ‘rebalance’ over ‘pivot’ because of the unintended
consequence of the initial use of ‘pivot’, which suggested ‘a complete movement
away’ from the Middle East and other parts of the world and therefore caused
concerns.29 Although the administration may not want the Middle East to continue
dominating American foreign policy to the extent it did over the past decade, the
25. Rodolfo C. Severino, ‘How will Obama’s no-show be remembered?’, East Asia Forum, (7 October 2013),
available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/07/how-will-obamas-no-show-be-remembered/#more-38174.
26. Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O’Rourke
and Bruce Vaughn, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia (Congressional
Research Service, 28 March 2013), p. 12.
27. After her statement was posted online, McFarland clarified through a DoD spokeswoman that ‘This a.m. when
I spoke at a conference, I was asked a question about the budget, that will be officially released today, and how it
relates to our pivot to Asia. I was reiterating what [Defense Secretary Chuck] Hagel said last week: That the shift in
focus to the Asia–Pacific requires us to “adapt, innovate, and make difficult (budgetary and acquisition) decisions to
ensure that our military remains ready and capable”. That’s exactly what we’ve done in this budget. The rebalance to
Asia can and will continue’. Zachary Fryer-Biggs, ‘DoD official: Asia pivot “can’t happen” due to budget pressures’,
Defense News, (4 March 2014), available at: http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140304/DEFREG02/
303040022/DoD-Official-Asia-Pivot-Can-t-Happen-Due-Budget-Pressures.
28. Tim Huxley, ‘Response to PacNet #35—US 1, China 0’, PacNet, #35R, (12 June 2012).
29. Hannah Allam, ‘Obama is still searching for right tone in executing “Asia pivot”’, McClatchy Newspapers,
(22 January 2013), available at: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/01/22/180696/obama-is-still-searching-for-right.
html.
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second-term Obama administration has been sucked back into Middle East conflicts,
including Israeli–Palestinian peace talks, nuclear negotiations with Iran, Syria’s civil
war and the Iraqi sectarian war. Secretary of State John Kerry’s first overseas trip
after taking office in February 2013 was to Europe and the Middle East to reassure
that the rebalance did not mean US disengagement from these regions. He visited the
Middle East three times before visiting Japan, Korea and China in April 2013.
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 that attracted global attention on President
Vladimir Putin’s trial of strength with the West added another urgent problem to a
burgeoning global list of distractions from the intended ‘rebalance’ to Asia. With
ongoing crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, there has been a sense that
Washington’s rebalancing strategy is losing its momentum, despite strong pledges
from the administration that the US remains committed to the region.
Sixth, after more than a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, isolationism has
gained ground in the US. A Pew poll in 2013 found an unprecedented lack of support
for American engagement with the rest of the world. The most striking poll result was
that, for the first time since it began to measure US public opinion in 1964, a
staggeringly high 52% of respondents said they agreed with the statement that ‘the
US should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the
best they can on their own’. That number had historically ranged between about 20
and 40%. When asked if they agreed that the US should ‘not think so much in
international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems’, 80%
surveyed said they agreed, an all-time high. More than half of Americans, 53%, said
that the United States was ‘less important and powerful as a world leader than it was
ten years ago’, the highest proportion of respondents to say as much since Pew started
asking the question in 1993. The rising American isolationism already had a real
impact on US foreign policy. In the fall of 2013 President Obama planned to launch
limited strikes against Syria as punishment for its use of chemical weapons against
civilians, yet overwhelming public and Congressional opposition ultimately killed
the plan. Reinforcing Americans’ views that the country shouldn’t be active abroad is
the growing impression that the United States just isn’t as capable.30 One observer
found that while a bullish US economy was a hot topic at the 2014 Davos World
Economic Forum, the most important emerging theme was America’s slow retreat
from its role as global policeman because of the concerns over the emergence of
American isolationism and reluctance to use its military muscle. The US went
through similar, inward-looking periods after the First World War and VietnamWar.
In both cases, international events compelled America to plunge back into global
affairs shortly thereafter. But this observer suggested that ‘it is also possible that, this
time, the shift towards non-intervention is structural rather than cyclical—reflecting a
US that is quietly adjusting to the rise of other major powers, in particular China’.31
These issues together would make containment extremely difficult, if not
impossible. It may also partially explain why a very small portion of Americans had
30. Max Fisher, ‘American isolationism just hit a 50-year high. Why that matters’,Washington Post, (4 December
2013), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/12/04/american-isolationism-just-
hit-a-50-year-high-why-that-matters/.
31. Gideon Rachman, ‘Get ready, the indispensable Americans are pulling back’, Financial Times, (20 January
2014), available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3b2a198-81c7-11e3-87d5-00144feab7de.html.
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feelings of antagonism against China in a 2013 poll.32 Although some analysts in the
US have been reluctant to accept President Xi’s lofty rhetoric of a new model of big
power relations and have preferred to work with China on concrete issue-areas
because it may lead to an implicit acceptance of China’s conception of core interests,
the Obama administration has responded positively to President Xi’s call because it
resonates with the long-standing US effort to integrate China into the existing
international system.
In fact, during the very first year of the Obama administration, Deputy Secretary of
State James Steinberg proposed a similar vision, known as ‘strategic reassurance’, i.e.
while the US must make clear that it is prepared to welcome China’s arrival as a
prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its
development and growing global rolewill not come at the expense of security andwell-
being of others.33 His rationale was that ‘History shows that actions by established
powers to resist or contain rising powers often contradict their stated purpose of
preventing conflict, and cause what they are trying to avert’. Therefore, ‘we have an
especially compelling need to work with China’. While the concept of ‘strategic
reassurance’ was dropped quickly in Washington because it caused confusion about
whether the US policy toward Chinawas changed toward one-sided engagement at the
time,34 the Obama administration has continued to look for ‘a comprehensive vision of
the two nation’s respective regional and global roles in the era of interdependence and
growing Chinese strength, a vision that hopefully can advance cooperation’.35
As a direct response to President Xi’s call, Secretary Hillary Clinton urged
Beijing and Washington ‘to find an answer, a new answer to the ancient question of
what happens when an established power and a rising power meet’.36 Tom Donilon,
Obama’s national security adviser, answered that the Obama administration joined
Beijing in rejecting the premise ‘that a rising power and an established power are
somehow destined for conflict’ and would work with China ‘to build a new model
of relations between an existing power and an emerging one. Xi Jinping and
President Obama have both endorsed this goal’.37 Making her first major speech on
US Asian policy in November 2013, Susan E. Rice, the successor to Donilon as
32. Ironically, a big percentage of Chinese saw the US as a threat to China’s rise. A survey of opinions across 65
countries by pollster Win/Gallup International in the end of 2013 found that Chinese and Americans do not have
mutual feelings of antagonism. While 49% of Chinese respondents put the US as the leading threat to world peace,
American respondents put China 7th at only 5%. Patrick Goodenough, ‘And the country posing the greatest threat to
peace as 2013 ends is . . . ’, CNCNews, (31 December 2013), available at: http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-
goodenough/and-country-posing-greatest-threat-peace-2013-ends.
33. James B. Steinberg, ‘East Asia and the Pacific: administration’s vision of the US–China relationship’,
Keynote Speech at Center for New America Security, 24 September 2009, available at: http://www.cnas.org/files/
multimedia/documents/Deputy%20Secretary%20James%20Steinberg’s%20September%2024,%202009%
20Keynote%20Address%20Transcript.pdf.
34. Josh Rogin, ‘The end of the concept of “strategic reassurance”?’, Foreign Policy, (6 November 2009),
available at: http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/06/the_end_of_the_concept_of_strategic_reassurance.
35. David M. Lampton, ‘A new type of major-power relationship: seeking a durable foundation for US–China
ties’, Asia Policy no. 16, (July 2013), p. 52.
36. Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at the US Institute of Peace China Conference’, 7 March 2012, available at: http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/185402.htm.
37. White House News Release, ‘Remarks by Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to the President: The
United States and the Asia–Pacific in 2013’, 11 March 2013, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a.
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Obama’s national security adviser, confirmed that the United States was seeking ‘a
new model of major power relations. That means managing inevitable competition
while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge’.38 Amid
criticism that the administration was overvaluing the need to ‘reassure’ China at the
expense of American and allied interests, President Obama, speaking to the 2014
US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, still stated that ‘We are committed to
the shared goal of developing over time a “new model” of relations with China
defined by increased practical cooperation and constructive management of
differences . . . we remain determined to ensure that cooperation defines the overall
relationship’.39
A delicate balance of power in the Asia–Pacific
To move from strategic distrust to strategic reassurance and build a new model of big
power relations, the US and China have to maintain a balance of power and oppose
the attempt of any single power at domination in the region. Balance of power
requires both countries to demonstrate a strategic restraint and eventually adopt the
strategy of Mutually Assured Restraint (MAR), which means that
both powers adopt measures that would allow China to take the steps it holds are
necessary for self-defense, without extending them to the point that they threaten other
nations or the international commons. It allows for the United States to take the steps it
holds necessary for self-defense, while living up to its obligations to its allies in the
region and maintaining the international order.40
The two largest Asia–Pacific powers have to develop a clearer understanding and a
greater mutual acceptance, or at least acknowledgement, of each other’s legitimate
interests and role in the region. They must also manage their relationships with their
regional partners in mind.
The balance of power, however, is very delicate. For the US, ‘the aim is to
constrain rather than contain China’.41 The US has to engage with a collaborative
China alongside the hedge against a belligerent Beijing to unilaterally change the
status quo while avoiding getting trapped in escalatory behavior. On the one hand, the
Obama administration has to demonstrate that the US is willing to lay down markers
when China infringes on US interest and causes regional instability. While military
balance is important, this effort should focus on participation in multilateral
institutions and interactions with emerging powers, refurbishing old alliances and
building new ones to help shape a regional multipolarity and avoid China primacy
38. Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice, ‘America’s future in Asia’, 20 November 2013,
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-
advisor-susan-e-rice.
39. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Statement by the President to the US–China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue’, 8 July 2014, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/08/statement-
president-us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue.
40. Amitai Etzioni, ‘MAR: a model for US–China relations’, Amitai Etzioni Notes, (20 September 2013),
available at: http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/2013/09/mar-a-model-for-us-china-relations.html.
41. Philip Stephens, ‘Danger in Xi’s rebuff to Obama’, Financial Times, (1 March 2012), available at: http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50a2c246-6390-11e1-b85b-00144feabdc0.html.
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after America primacy. China is rising as one of multiple powers and balanced in a
way that fits into the emerging international and regional order.
On the other hand, the US has to demonstrate self-restraint and work with China to
construct a regional order based on rules and norms, allowing China to grow and be
secured but not use its new might to force neighbors’ hands. Through self-restraint,
the US may demonstrate the long-term benefits Beijing would enjoy from a Chinese
regional posture that ‘eschews egregious pressure, intimidation, and zero-sum
competition and embraces existing world norms that hold promise for uninterrupted
Chinese development’.42 One example is the Chinese acceptance of the US invitation
to participate in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014, the world’s largest international
maritime exercise, hosted biannually by the US navy. As two American naval
analysts indicated, in spite of US critics arguing against China’s inclusion based on
its assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, ‘it represents progressive
cooperation amid persistent tensions’ and the US willingness of ‘encouraging China
to participate more actively in global governance by integrating it into existing
maritime governance mechanisms’.43
Taking a rules-based approach, the US has to respect China’s reasonable concerns
involving its core interests in light of established international norms. Although the
US holds the stronger military power capacity, the balance of interests in the region
strongly favors China because the various diplomatic and territorial quarrels roiling
East Asia are of much greater salience and concern to China than to the US. Their
outcomes more profoundly affect the national security of the much closer China than
the more distant US.
In this case, US involvement in regional conflicts must fall within certain limits to
allow tensions between China and its neighbors to subside. The US has to discourage
both China and its neighbors from adopting provocative acts in an attempt to invite a
hostile response. It is impossible for the US to referee the welter of legal, historical
and emotional arguments that accompany each of these disputes, so the US has to be
careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with
China. As US security commitments to its regional allies could embolden them to
harden their bargaining positions toward Beijing, the US should not encourage its
regional allies to pursue their territorial claims to the extent of increasing the risk of
conflict with China and escalating into larger international conflicts. China is rapidly
becoming too strong for the US to maintain an unquestionable capacity to intervene
successfully in regional conflicts. America has to decide if it can afford the cost of
taking on China in an effort to back its Asian allies in a fight they pick.
Talking about the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Jeff Bader, former
Asian policy advisor to President Obama, made a good point:
42. Robert G. Sutter, Michael E. Brown and Timothy J. A. Adamson with Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa
Ollapally, ‘Balancing acts: the US rebalance and Asia–Pacific stability’, Report of Rising Power Initiative (The
George Washington University, August 2013), available at: http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/
uploads/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf.
43. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, ‘China’s RIMPAC debut: what’s in it for America?’, National
Interest, (3 July 2014), available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-rimpac-debut-what%E2%
80%99s-it-america-10801?page¼show.
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The US does not wish to see China gain control over the area through coercion. But at the
same time the US does not have an interest in making the South China Sea venue of
confrontation or conflict between the US and China. Frontal challenges to Chinese
claims, if not founded on international norms and consistent with US principles, run the
risk of inciting heightened Chinese nationalism and paranoia over US intentions and
producing more aggressive Chinese behavior in the region that would victimize the other
claimants without an effective US response.44
Following this advice, the Obama administration has taken a position of neutrality on
sovereignty disputes and encouraged all countries concerned to adhere to
international law. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs stated, ‘International law, not power or an ambiguous sense of
historical entitlement, should be the basis for making and enforcing maritime claims
in the South China Sea’.45
Although the US is ill-positioned to promote international law based solutions
because of its own failure to ratify UNCLOS and to take the International Court of
Justice seriously enough historically, it has taken the position that international law,
rather than force and the threat of force, should be employed to resolve maritime
claims disputes in the increasingly-tense region. At the ASEAN Regional Forum in
July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the legal principle that claims to
water could only be based on legitimate land-based claims.46 Supporting the drafting
of a broad and robust code of conduct for the claimants in order to establish rules and
clear procedures for peacefully addressing disagreements, the US made clear its
objection to China’s ‘nine-dash line’ because it is not based on international law.
Assistant Secretary of State Danny Russell testified in February 2014 that
Any use of the ‘nine-dash line’ by China to claim maritime rights not based on claimed
land features would be inconsistent with international law. The international community
would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim to bring it in
accordance with the international law of the sea.47
The management of its alliance with Japan is also a challenge to Washington.
Whereas the US would want to deter China from taking aggressive actions against
Japan, it cannot afford to blindly endorse everything that Tokyo does and, if
necessary, should restrain Japan from taking provocative actions. Conflict between
China and Japan has increased as vessels from both countries patrol the waters around
the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku on a daily basis, raising the likelihood of unintended
escalation. The US, as Tokyo’s principal ally, risks being drawn into a military
confrontation. The challenge to the Obama administration increased after Shinzo Abe
44. Jeffrey A. Bader, ‘The US and China’s nine-dash line: ending the ambiguity’, Brookings Institution, 6
February 2014, available at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/06-us-china-nine-dash-line-bader.
45. ‘Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Fuchs remarks at South China Sea Conference’, 11 July 2014,
available at: http://brandtsrandomgovernmentpressreleases.blogspot.com/2014/07/michael-fuchs-makes-remarks-at-
south.html.
46. ‘Comments by Secretary Clinton in Hanoi’, 23 July 2010, available at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/
english/texttrans/2010/07/20100723164658su0.4912989.html#axzz31ACT8N6s.
47. Daniel R. Russel, ‘Maritime disputes in East Asia, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific’, 5 February 2014, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/
221293.htm.
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came to office because the Japanese government has risked alienating not just China
but also the US by ‘foreign policy gaffes that seem designed to give maximum
offence to its Asian neighbors while causing maximum embarrassment to its western
allies’.48 For example, after Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine on 26 December 2013, a New York Times Editorial Board article suggested
that ‘the United States needs to make it clear that Mr Abe’s agenda is not in the
region’s interest. Surely what is needed in Asia is trust among states, and his actions
undermine that trust’.49 Abe’s aggressive remarks and actions, coupled with Japan’s
waning military power, could put America in a dangerous position.
China has to make a strategic choice too. It may either seek regional hegemony and
drive the US out of Asia in a potentially violent power rivalry as some Chinese
hawkish commentators advocated, or work with the US to maintain a balance of
power in the region to prevent unwanted strategic rivalry and ensure that competition
between them is peaceful. The first choice is appealing to Chinese popular
nationalists but is extremely costly, if not unrealistic at least in the foreseeable future
because the size of the Chinese economy may eventually overtake that of the US but
China can never replace the role of the US.While it has become difficult for the US to
hold its primacy in the region, it is equally, if not more difficult for China to step into
America’s shoes as a regional hegemon. Whether or not achieving dominance in the
region is an ultimate objective in the long run, it cannot be a serious Chinese
objective in the early twenty-first century because of the presence and influence of the
US, Japan and other regional powers. The US strategic rebalance may have lost
steam, but China is still far from the position to dislodge American power any time
soon. While China is rising, many surrounding states are also on the rise and may not
be keen to accept a Chinese-dominated regional order. China’s rising power itself,
therefore, has motivated some of its neighbors to pursue balancing activities,
including realignment with the US and with each other. It doesn’t serve Chinese
strategic interests to have tensions with so many neighbors simultaneously. China has
to find ways to win the support of its Asian neighbors in order to balance the US
influence, or at least pre-empt the balancing motives of its neighbors by pursuing
strategic restraint. China’s long-term interests are to have a relationship with its
neighbors as well as the US based on trust, mutual respect, cooperation and the rule of
international law.
Beijing should work with the US and its neighbors to construct a regional order
based on norms and rules because China benefited immensely from the international
system created under US leadership after WWII, underpinning stability and
economic growth in the region. As one Chinese commentator admitted, although
China did not participate in setting the rules of international economic engagement
built by the United States and its Western allies over many decades, ‘China became
the largest beneficiary by taking maximum advantage of globalization’. According
to him,
48. Gideon Rachman, ‘A gaffe-prone Japan is a danger to peace in Asia’, Financial Times, (12 August 2013),
available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c4d9e34c-033a-11e3-9a46-00144feab7de.html.
49. The Editorial Board, ‘Risky nationalism in Japan’, New York Times, (26 December 2013), available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/opinion/risky-nationalism-in-japan.html?_r¼0.
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A large part of the world has prospered under such an arrangement (American global
leadership) . . . These nations are essentially free riders, of which China is the biggest and
most successful one . . . China’s most notable accomplishment in the past three decades
is, perhaps, its success in engaging, and in many cases mastering, the international
economic system setup and maintained by the US-led West without being absorbed
by it.50
Although it is uncomfortable with the United States becoming more militarily and
strategically engaged in its home region, Beijing has also benefited from the security
role that the United States has played in the Asia–Pacific. Residing in a neighborhood
with complicated power competition and historical animosities, Chinese leaders have
to be measured and judicious. While the San Francisco system of US bilateral
alliances in the region is viewed as an arrangement that reeks of Cold War dynamics,
this system has to a great extent helped ensure regional countries’ security and
stability. China often expresses concern over the US–Japan alliance to contain
China. Yet the US–Japan alliance is part of the regional security architecture that has
underpinned the stability in East Asia and prevented a potential remilitarization of
Japan. Without the US nuclear umbrella, Japan would have developed nuclear
weapons a long time ago, prompting South Korea and even Taiwan to develop their
own nuclear weapons. It is from this perspective that one observer asked Chinese
leaders to ‘imagine what the regional security picture would look like to China if
Japan were strategically independent from the United States’.51 As one Chinese
scholar suggested ‘Chinese policymakers and analysts should not believe their own
jingoistic rhetoric about a US in decline. Even if it’s true, a weak America isn’t good
news for China’.52 Although Beijing may not like some of the rules and norms made
under the US leadership, Beijing’s interests will be served best by participation in the
making and remaking of the rules rather than by challenging the rule-based regional
order.
As realists, Chinese leaders ultimately have to come to the power reality, i.e. while
it is increasingly difficult for the US to maintain primacy, China cannot be the single
power of domination in the region either. In addition to the external challenges, China
faces immense internal huddles in its rise. Self-preservation, stability and continued
economic growth are its primary concerns. As Kishore Mahbubani suggested, the
internal challenge ‘is a far bigger issue for China’s leaders than sovereignty over
some barren rocks in nearby seas’. Mahbubani, a well-known Western-basher and
long-time friend of Beijing, became anxious about the possibility of an upcoming
conflict sparked by China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the territorial disputes.
He warned that ‘China is on the verge of destroying a geopolitical miracle’ because
‘with little warning, three decades of careful management of its external challenges
have been replaced by three years of assertive and occasionally reckless actions’,
50. Eric X. Li, ‘The middle kingdom and the coming world disorder’, The World Post, (4 February 2014),
available at: http://feedly.com/k/1e3JeDm.
51. Robert A Manning, ‘China and the US–Japan alliance’, East Asia Forum, (28 October 2013), available at:
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/28/china-and-the-us-japan-alliance/.
52. Zha Daojiong, ‘China must see past its own hype of an America in decline’, The South China Morning Post,
(18 June 2014), available at: http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/1535623/china-must-see-past-its-own-hype-
america-decline?page¼all.
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leading to ‘an emerging Western media consensus that China has become an
expansionist military power, threatening its neighbors and the world’.53 A leading
scholar of China–US relations expressed a similar view that
China must transform the traditional way of thinking and strategic outlook and shift the
national security defense priority from partial external military conflict risk to overall
internal system reform. This is the key for China to successfully meet the current strategic
challenges.54
Although China was a relative bright spot during the global downturn due to the
quick and massive stimulation, no economy keeps growing at the same pace forever.
As an emerging economy, China faces similar problems to other emerging economies
in history, one of which tends to be periods of rapid growth followed by periods of
stagnation. Chinese growth would likely be in line with other Asian economies, such
as Japan and South Korea, which experienced stagnation following high growth.
After about three decades of remarkable growth rates, China’s economic growth has
slowed and could come to a pause or even a setback. This is very serious given the
increasingly tense domestic environment and problems that breakneck growth
engenders, including environmental destruction, rampant corruption, a growing gulf
between rich and poor, widespread bad loans, huge local government debt, and
looming demographic challenges that are worsened by the fact that it will be the first
country to get old before it gets rich. A slowing economy would place huge pressure
on Chinese leaders, who are aware that resentment among China’s have-nots has the
potential to evolve into a concerted challenge to the Communist Party’s legitimacy
and authority. China is a fragile rising power with profound internal causes of
concern that have the potential to derail its rise. Pan Wei, a professor at Beijing
University, rightfully suggested that ‘Nobody can destroy China if China does not
destroy itself first’ (‘中华不自乱，无人可乱华’).55 To ensure its further rise, China
must put its own house in order first. Until China can resolve these internal problems,
its future rise faces uncertainties.
Conclusion
The Asia–Pacific region has become a test ground to determine whether China and
the United States can build a new model of big power relations. The stakes for both
China and the US are high but these two countries have failed to agree on how to
prevent their relationship from falling into the ‘Thucydides trap’. As for the causes of
the failure, there are always those in each country who believe the other country has
to make substantial changes. While some Americans have criticized China for
become increasingly assertive and have urged China to avoid following the
53. Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Helping China’s doves’, The New York Times, (17 July 2014), available at: http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/07/18/opinion/helping-chinas-doves.html.
54. 袁鹏 [Yuan Peng], ‘中国真正的挑战在哪里’ [‘Where are the true challenges to China’],人民日报海外版
[People’s Daily, Overseas Edition ], (31 July 2013), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-07/31/c_
112575005.htm.
55. 潘维 [Pan Wei], ‘中华不自乱，无人可乱华’ [‘Nobody can destroy China if China does not destroy itself
first’],环球时报 [Global Times ], (25 April 2013).
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expansionist road of old imperialist powers, many Chinese believe building this new
relationship depends overwhelmingly on the US changing the way it works with
China and adapting to the new reality of China’s rise. China has even stated explicitly
that to achieve this new model would only require changes on the US side because
‘China has never done anything to undermine the US core interests and major
concerns’. In contrast,
what the US has done in matters concerning China’s core and important interests and
major concerns are unsatisfactory. China is not the maker of these problems, and still less
the perpetrator of the harm. Rather, it is a victim on which harm has been imposed.56
Therefore,
the principal barrier in building a new model of big power relations between China and
the US is on the US side. The ball is entirely in the US’s court. So long as the US can
make efforts in the same direction as China does, there is hope. Otherwise, the same
situation ‘you are either with us or against us’ will remain. Twists and turns or even
tension might emerge in Sino–US relationship from time to time. This is the last thing
China would like to see. What would such as consequence mean for the US, which has all
along been seeking the maximization of its own interests?57
No country is responsible alone for the problems. Strategic mistrust is unavoidable
because the US–China relationship has always been characterized by various degrees
of friction that no amount of sophisticated diplomacy can easily solve. Self-
righteousness and lack of empathy can only intensify the China–US strategic rivalry.
If leaders in bothWashington and Beijing do not strive to engage each other on points
of mutual interest while working separately to secure their interests by maintaining a
delicate balance of power, a mixture of self-righteousness and miscalculations could
turn the China–US rivalry into a new Cold War, which, as John Mearsheimer
cautioned, would be more dangerous than the previous American–Soviet Cold War
because it lacks the singular center of gravity associated with US–Soviet conflict and
features more hotspots, including the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the
South and East China Seas.58 The Asia–Pacific would thus become one of the most
dangerous flashpoints in the twenty-first century.
56. 崔天凯,庞含兆 [Cui Tiankai and Pang Hanzhao], ‘新时期中国外交全局中的中美关系—兼论中美共建新
型大国关系’ [‘China–US relations in China’s overall diplomacy in the new era—on China and US working together
to build a new-type of relationship between major countries’], 中国国际战略评论 2012 [China International
Strategy Review 2012 ], available at: http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2012-07/20/content_25969559_3.htm.
57. 王嵎生 [Wang Yusheng], ‘中美建立新型大国关系可能么?’ [‘Is it possible for China and the US to build a
new type of big power relationship?’], 外交 [Foreign Affairs Journal ] no. 1, (2013), p. 102.
58. Zachary Keck, ‘US–China rivalry more dangerous than Cold War?’, The Diplomat, (28 January 2014),
available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/us-china-rivalry-more-dangerous-than-cold-war/.
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